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September 2005 Securing the Homefront There can be no guarantees that terrorists will never strike on Australian soil. However, as we approach the Prime Minister’s summit on security there are three clear lessons from the tragedies of Madrid, London and New York - as well as from the successful prevention of a planned embassy bombing in Singapore - which we should now adopt. Most importantly Australia urgently needs a comprehensive national database, which consolidates critical security information currently held by the States. Second, there is a legitimate and dramatic need to establish a more comprehensive and linked national closed circuit television network. Third, there needs to be co-ordinated education and legislation aimed at identifying those who incite violence, while simultaneously encouraging those who practice diversity of culture within a commitment to Australia and the rule of law. The challenge with each of these tasks is to take legitimate steps towards security while not falling prey to erosion of our rights, freedoms and heterogeneity. The first priority must be for a truly national police and crime database. At present, the Commonwealth’s CrimTrac database is used nationally by law enforcement agencies to store selected information including DNA, fingerprints, details of child sex offenders and criminal histories. Crim Trac has however been hampered by the failure of relevant authorities to allow consolidation of data relating to activities such as explosives licences, chemical purchases, ammonium nitrate fertiliser purchases, people undergoing flight training or holding an aviation licence. It is inconceivable that not one police database in the country would know who has an explosives license. As we have seen with September 11 and the Oklahoma bombing, terror and extremism have profited by leveraging the seemingly ordinary tools of life: flight lessons, garden fertiliser or training as a security guard – the last of which underpinned a recent Saudi Arabian terrorist attack. Against such seemingly ordinary activities the essence of detection is in linking patterns of behaviour. The merging of intelligence with public data, while never full-proof against actions conceived in darkness and carried out in silence, provides an indispensable tool. In short, the Premiers - as well as relevant Federal agencies - must agree as a matter of urgency to link data about potentially risky behaviour with the nation’s CrimTrac System. Gun licences, explosives licences, aviation licences, chemical and fertiliser purchases should all legitimately be cross-referenced with not only criminal records but also with national intelligence data regarding suspected extremist behaviour. The need for such a national database is clear – put simply, we face a new type of threat in which the general population is at risk from the most destructive violence. The power of such a database is also clear. It will allow the investigation of linked patterns of behaviour which would otherwise simply not be detected: The acolyte of a firebrand extremist, a crop duster’s license, the purchase of noxious chemicals. This could be either a perfectly harmless scenario or it could be the harbinger of a tragedy. However, without a truly comprehensive and linked national database we may never have the chance to make the discrete inquiries. A national database is of course only one security tool. A second tool must be observation. The current Australian system of closed circuit television is state based, piecemeal and inadequate. The lesson of the London bombings and the subsequent attempted bombings is that a comprehensive closed circuit television network is a vital tool. Closed circuit television did not stop the first round of bombing. It did however allow for the rapid arrest of the would-be second round of bombers before they could flee or successfully repeat their attempted carnage. Within Australia there are two problems with our closed circuit television network. First, the number of cameras is woefully inadequate and second co-ordination of images is almost non-existent. In Melbourne, for example, there are less than 200 safe city cameras. These are monitored by the Council and when an incident occurs the footage of a potential crime is beamed into the Melbourne East Police Station and Police Communications Centre. Even with so few cameras, there has been significant capture of drug trafficking and assault on video. However, offenders walk out of shot. Very simply, the London experience tells us that, as we approach the Commonwealth Games, there must be a dramatic upgrade in the number of cameras and they must be brought together into a unified system. Significantly, the community experience in the UK has not been that the cameras are an intrusion, but that they provide a sense of security for law abiding citizens. The third task of the security summit must be to agree on a national education and legislative program to protect communities vulnerable to extremism. The program must both expose those who incite violence while celebrating those who peacefully practice their culture or beliefs no matter how different to mainstream culture. Following September 11 and the London bombings, racial profiling was raised as a means of identifying terror suspects. But it is thwart with danger. Firstly, racial profiling can alienate and stereotype communities already coping with intolerance. Secondly, its effectiveness is dubious because it relies on cultural characteristics to identify a terrorist rather than on behaviour, which has been shown to be a key indicator in terrorist attacks. Indeed in Australia, many terror suspects would not have been identified if racial profiling alone were used. There is much that can be learned from the British experience but it is important to acknowledge the shortfalls of relying only on a mechanism that gives terrorism a cultural uniform. Australia is at risk from attack. Australia is also a wonderful, diverse and harmonious society. As we go forward, it is not possible to guarantee freedom from terrorist attack, but it is possible through tough security measures such as a national database, closed circuit television and the isolations of extremists to strengthen our security without compromising our society.
Hon Greg Hunt MP is the Federal Member for Flinders and a former
Senior Adviser to the Foreign Minister |
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